


# Deductive Verification vs. Model Checking for Physical Safety of a Feedback-Controlled Drone

Eric Yang and Can Afacan


Northwestern

# Ariane 5 Flight 501



One missed test + physical system = catastrophic failure

# Ariane 5 Flight 501



So, how do we prove safety before deployment?

# Introducing Formal Verification



Program testing can be used to  
show the presence of bugs, but  
never to show their absence!

— *Edsger Dijkstra* —

AZ QUOTES


# Specifications




# Verification



# Deductive Prover vs Model Checker




# Deductive Prover vs Model Checker



# Experiment: Simulation in 3D Space

# Simulation Setup



# Specifications

P1. The drone always remains in the green+orange region:

$\square(q \in S)$

# Specifications

P1. The drone always remains in the green+orange region:

$$\square(q \in S)$$

P2. The drone never exceeds the prescribed speed limit:

$$\square(\|v\| \leq v_{\max})$$

# Specifications

P1. The drone always remains in the green+orange region:

$$\square(q \in S)$$


P2. The drone never exceeds the prescribed speed limit:

$$\square(\|v\| \leq v_{\max})$$


P3. Whenever the drone enters the orange region, it eventually returns to the green region:


$$\square(q \in B \rightarrow \diamond(q \in S_{\text{in}}))$$

# Controller Design



# Controller Design





# Running Formal Verification



What are the tradeoffs for each method of formal verification in this experiment?

# Quantitative Comparison

| Method       | Lines of Code | Verification Evidence           | Runtime |
|--------------|---------------|---------------------------------|---------|
| TLA+/<br>TLC | 144           | 6.89 million reachable states   | 75 s    |
| nuSMV        | 166           | 19.74 billion symbolic states   | 14.5 s  |
| Lean 4       | 497           | 3 specification theorems proved | Instant |

# Tradeoffs for Physical Safety

TLA & nuSMV:

- Fast and compact
- Less expressive (Finite or Discrete State Systems)
- Less effort

# Tradeoffs for Physical Safety

TLA & nuSMV:

- Fast and compact
- Less expressive (Finite or Discrete State Systems)
- Less effort

Lean:

- More involved and time consuming
- More scalable
- More expressive

# Tradeoffs for Physical Safety

TLA & nuSMV:

- Fast and compact
- Less expressive (Finite or Discrete State Systems)
- Less effort

Lean:

- More involved and time consuming
- More scalable
- More expressive

DroneLean/

```
|_ Controller.lean  
|_ Dynamics.lean  
|_ Invariants.lean  
|_ Properties.lean  
|_ SafetyProofs.lean  
|_ Types.lean  
|_ VelocityBound.lean
```

# Conclusions

- We modeled a controller-operated drone with safety specifications.
- Use different verification paradigm to verify the same safety goals.
- TLA+/TLC and nuSMV exhaustive checked the possible states of the model.
- Lean 4 proved the safety result mathematically.

# Conclusions

- We modeled a controller-operated drone with safety specifications.
- Use different verification paradigm to verify the same safety goals.
- TLA+/TLC and nuSMV exhaustive checked the possible states of the model.
- Lean 4 proved the safety result mathematically.
- Main takeaway: **model checkers are faster for exploring behavior; Lean scales better, gives stronger mathematical assurance but costs more proof effort.**

# Future Directions

- Add richer physics (e.g. Wind, Disturbances)

# Future Directions

- Add richer physics (e.g. Wind, Disturbances)
- Add more complex controller logic

# Future Directions

- Add richer physics (e.g. Wind, Disturbances)
- Add more complex controller logic
- Multi-agent system

Thank you!